FROM ROBERT LAWRENCE KUHN, HOST AND CREATOR OF CLOSER TO TRUTH: We know what it means to see, hear, feel, and smell. We know, more than we know anything, what our “inner experience” feels like. Now, how is it possible that such inner experience is, literally, clumps of brain cells, their flowing chemicals and electrical impulses? The two things—inner experience and brain cells sloshing and sparking—seem so radically different!
So what is it about the brain that enables neuroscientists to claim they can explain the mind? And what is it about such scientific explanations of consciousness that some philosophers reject? This is the traditional “mind-body problem” in philosophy, an endless debate that has generated libraries of books.
For proper biologists, it used to be that studying the mind, or consciousness, was off limits, outside the scope of serious science, shunned. Scientists could tackle brain function, of course, determining which parts do what. But mind? Well, no, that was slippery, airy. Too loose. Too “philosophical.”
Christof Koch, a professor of biology and engineering at the California Institute of Technology, is a serious scientist who takes consciousness seriously. He seeks what he calls the “neural correlates of consciousness,” which generally means the kinds of electrical activities that occur in the brain each and every time that a certain conscious experience occurs. Koch has made the neural correlates of consciousness real science by bringing progressively greater precision to assessing what’s happening in the brain, in real time, when subjective experiences are sensed or felt.
When I did my doctorate in brain research at the University of California, Los Angeles 40 years ago, this was what I had dreamed of.
But correlation is not cause, as Koch is the first to point out. And the correlations thus far describe specific sensations, not a unified consciousness. But is there a real difference? Some say that consciousness is the illusory construct of multiple independent sensations fighting for attention like kids in a kindergarten. In philosopher Daniel Dennett’s formulation, consciousness is “fame in the brain.” If true, this demystification of consciousness would make the task of discovering its neurobiological basis much easier. In any event, can science, sticking with pure biology and its underlying chemistry and physics, produce a full theory of mind or consciousness?
Dr. Rodolfo Llinas, chairman of the department of physiology and neuroscience at New York University, has a full theory. He explains the swirl of consciousness by identifying it, quite literally, with swirling circuits in the brain—in particular, the recursive and continuous electrical circuitry between the thalamus, a relay and integration center in the middle of the brain, and the cerebral cortex, which controls the higher aspects of sensation and thought in the folds (gyri) and furrows (sulci) that cover the brain. To Llinas, these ceaseless upward and downward currents are not only how consciousness works, they are also what consciousness is. He calls it, “The I of the Vortex.”
Can brain-explaining-mind be that simple?
Before I inquire of philosophers, I must ask whether mind or consciousness can exist outside of biological brains. Is there anything special about biological brains? Can other kinds of “brains” also be conscious? My question—how can brain explain mind?—becomes more complex for highly advanced machines, or, as futurist and visionary Ray Kurzweil puts it, “nonbiological intelligences.”
Ultimately, says Kurzweil, these nonbiological intelligences will appear to be conscious: Every test of consciousness they will pass. They will be, or seem to be, no less conscious than your spouse, best friend, or children. There will be no way to tell the difference between a machine and a human. But are these nonbiological intelligences really conscious, with inner subjective experiences in their own private innards?
We can never know, says Kurzweil, not even in principle. I think he’s right: A true “consciousness detector” is, in principle, impossible to construct because it is always possible to give correct answers, no matter how detailed, without inner experience. For nonbiological intelligences, the crux of the problem will be the same as it is for the “other minds” problem in philosophy—how can one be absolutely certain that other people are conscious? The difference, of course, is that other people, other minds, are constructed like I am constructed, with wet brains or meat brains (choose your descriptor), and because I am sure that I am conscious, I can reason by analogy and become highly confident that other people are similarly conscious. But such wet-brain or meat-brain chauvinism masks the functional conundrum that if all functions are exactly the same, how then could the essence be different?
What then is mind? I’ve hit the limit in science. I turn to philosophy.
When I think of philosophy of mind, I think of John Searle at the University of California, Berkeley, who likes to follow the facts, wherever they lead. To Searle, it’s obviously false that consciousness doesn’t exist, and just as obviously false that consciousness is not part of the physical world.
To him, consciousness is real and irreducible, caused by brain processes, realized in the brain, and functions causally.
But if he’s right, I’m troubled. Because then, I think, consciousness would be the only thing in the universe that is “causally reduced” to brain function—meaning that the entire cause of mind is brain—but not “ontologically reduced” to brain function—meaning that the “being” or “essence” of mind is not brain.
Mind as caused entirely by brain? But not existing as brain? Can cause and existence be so radically different? What is going on here? Why should consciousness be so very special? And if consciousness is so very special, maybe its specialness goes beyond Searle’s somewhat subtle distinction.
I need something more. David Chalmers, an Australian philosopher of mind, has something more. Consciousness, he claims, is not an accidental derivative of reality working randomly but a fundamental part of reality existing permanently. For decades, there had been a progressive demystification of consciousness. Then, along came Chalmers.
To him, no matter how much neuroscience we learn, we will never explain consciousness. No matter how good the correlations of brain to mind, they could never literally be mind. There must be something extra in consciousness, which can never be explained by anything physical, chemical, or biological.
Chalmers gives me what I need. But what I think I need may be like a friend who is false; Santa Claus for a child.
So can the traditional mind-body problem be solved by science? For me, not so fast.
Most scientists explain mental activity in the purely physical terms of brain function, while others contend that consciousness must be generated by unknown, radically new kinds of laws. Still others wonder anew whether mind has existence beyond the brain and is a wholly different kind of stuff.
Can neuroscience explain consciousness, reducing mind to brain?
Or does mind maintain an independent existence, an irreducible element of reality?
Of only this I’m really sure: The choice is stark—mind is only brain vs. mind is more than brain. The dichotomy will lead us closer to truth.
Robert Lawrence Kuhn speaks with Christof Koch, Rodolfo Llinas, Ray Kurzweil, John Searle, Daniel Dennett, David Chalmers, and Alan Leshner in "Can Brain Explain Mind?" the 17th episode in the Closer to Truth: Cosmos, Consciousness, God TV series, which airs Thursdays on the PBS HD network and many other PBS stations. Every Friday, participants in the series will share their views on the previous day's episode.
Friday, January 2, 2009
Can Brain Explain Mind?
Posted by Heather Wax at 10:15 AM 0 comments
Labels: Closer to Truth
Friday, January 23, 2009
What Is the Mind-Body Problem?
FROM ROBERT LAWRENCE KUHN, HOST AND CREATOR OF CLOSER TO TRUTH: What are we? What’s the relationship between the thoughts in our minds and the brains in our heads? Is mind stuff different from brain stuff? Or is there something special about mental activity that’s not crammed into craniums? Something special that makes us human? Something non-brain? Something nonphysical?
These questions compose the “mind-body problem,” which has enticed philosophers for centuries (and beguiled me for decades) and touches all we know and do as human beings. I thought that getting a doctorate in brain research would help me figure it out. I’m not sure it did.
To frame the mind-body problem, I start with John Searle, a renowned philosopher of mind at the University of California, Berkeley. Searle critiques both standard solutions—materialism (all thought is reduced to brain) and dualism (mind is totally different from brain). He says both materialism and dualism are “trying to say something true—it’s just that they both end up saying something false. And the trick is to try to preserve the true part .... The materialist says, ‘Reality is ultimately physical particles and fields of force.’ That’s right. But then the materialist denies the irreducibility and existence of the mental. The dualist grants the irreducibility and existence of the mental, but then says it’s ‘not part of the physical world.’ That’s wrong. Most philosophers are materialists of some kind or another because they just think dualism fails.”
Searle’s position is clear: Consciousness is real and based entirely on the brain, and once we learn enough about the brain, we will know everything about consciousness. I know something about the brain, but I cannot yet imagine how knowing even a whole lot more would explain our inner sense of consciousness.
Ned Block, formerly at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, now at New York University, draws an analogy: “Consciousness is like water. It has a biological essence. So the mind-body problem for consciousness is one where the question is: What is the biological nature of the mind? The mind-body problem for thought and other aspects of cognition likely turns out to be mainly functional; it’s a matter of how thought, how representations in the mind, function so as to produce thinking.” As to what happened to the postulation of the “Identity” solution—that is, that the mind is wholly equal to the brain—Block states, “The problem is the explanatory gap: how it could be that the neuro basis of a given phenomenal state is the neuro basis of that state as opposed to some other phenomenal state or no state at all. We don’t understand that, and furthermore, we don’t even see how we could understand it.”
With all I know about the brain, I can imagine explaining expressions or outputs of consciousness but never its inner sense or feeling.
Some would say that I’m looking in the wrong direction. Traditionally, almost everyone assumed that human beings had a nonphysical soul. The soul was the real you, a position most philosophers now reject.
Not J.P. Moreland, a Christian philosopher, who claims that the “fundamental questions about the nature of consciousness and whether there is a soul are just not scientific questions; they’re questions like, what is a thought? What is a semantic meaning? There has never been a single discovery in neuroscience or any other branch of science that a dualist—that is, one who believes in a soul—could not easily accommodate within his or her theory.”
Moreland goes on to argue, “There are things true of conscious states that aren’t true of physical states, so they can’t be the same thing. Thoughts are either true or false, but no brain state is either true or false. A thought can’t be located close to my left ear, but the brain state that’s going on while I’m having a thought is located in a region of the brain. The brain state has a shape and a size, but the thought itself doesn’t. Thoughts have internationality—they are about things—but no material state of the brain is about anything. One more example: There is a what-it’s-like to be conscious. There is a what-it’s-like to feel pain, a what-it’s-like to see red. What-it’s-like is not something that can be captured in the language of physics, chemistry, or neuroscience.”
As for the neural correlates of consciousness, Moreland gives this analogy: “Suppose that I were in an automobile and I was trapped in the driver’s seat with a seat belt and I couldn’t get out. My ability to drive around town would depend on whether the car was working; if the car broke down, I wouldn’t be able to move. That wouldn’t prove I was the car. That would simply prove that I am functionally dependent upon the car when I’m in the car. So I think that neural scientific correlations are exactly what the dualists would expect.” Correlation and identity are not the same.
I’d love to see the soul exist, solve the mind-body problem—and get a shot at immortality as a kind of bonus. But if it’s that simple, and that important, why doesn’t everyone get it?
Marvin Minsky certainly doesn’t get it. He’s a pioneer of artificial intelligence and argues quite the opposite: that what we call the mind is entirely the output of the biological machine we call the brain. When I tell Minsky that many believe that there’s something extra, some soul, that we need to introduce or inject to make human consciousness—that we need to marry some sort of a nonphysical thing with a physical thing—he responds with indignation: “That sounds just plain silly because how does a soul help? Unless you tell me what are a soul’s parts and how they work, you haven’t answered anything. All you’ve done is provided a word to keep you from thinking about a hard question. When you think you see ‘redness,’ there isn’t any redness. There’s a very complicated process that goes on in many different parts of the brain when you see red. People who talk about a soul are just people who are too ignorant or unambitious or lazy or faith-ridden—I don’t know what insults to hurl at them ....”
To Colin McGinn, a University of Oxford philosopher teaching in the United States, the mind-body problem is a profound mystery. McGinn is so passionate about the depth of this mystery, he is called a “mysterian.” He claims that consciousness “has a nature which makes it really different from the brain .... What is it about the brain which explains why the brain and only the brain gives rise to this phenomenal experience that we call consciousness?”
McGinn rejects brain complexity as a solution for two reasons. “First,” he says, “lots of things are very complex, and yet those things don’t have lower degrees of consciousness. The kidneys are less complex than the brain; do kidneys have a degraded or lower form of consciousness? There’s no reason to think that. So why should the mere number of connections between neurons generate consciousness? We’re moving from one kind of thing to another kind of thing, and complexity doesn’t seem to breach the gap at all .... As far as we can see, within the conceptual scheme that we have now, which has worked so well with the empirical world, nothing removes the mystery.”
Lest there be misunderstanding, McGinn adds quickly, “But that doesn’t lead me to any position which postulates a purpose of the universe or anything of the kind because my explanation for why consciousness is so baffling to us is a resolute naturalistic explanation. It arises from the fact that our own intelligence has been evolved, has evolved as an adaptation, and has the kind of limits that any intelligence or any species on the planet has.”
To me, here’s what’s odd: all these distinguished philosophers, each with a different solution to the mind-body problem. Not just “different.” Radically different! To some, our mind is just our brain. To others, we need a soul. To others still, we don’t even need a brain—any good machine could do. Finally, some say consciousness is such a mystery that it may remain forever so.
Such divergence is not the way of science, especially with increasing knowledge about the brain. What’s going on?
Perhaps this paradox is a type of clue? Perhaps the answer is of a different kind?
The mind-body problem, ages old but perennially new, leads us … closer to truth.
Robert Lawrence Kuhn speaks with John Searle, Ned Block, J.P. Moreland, Marvin Minsky, Alva Noë, and Colin McGinn in "What Is the Mind-Body Problem?" the 20th episode in the Closer to Truth: Cosmos, Consciousness, God TV series, which airs Thursdays on the PBS HD network and many other PBS stations. Every Friday, participants in the series will share their views on the previous day's episode.
Posted by Heather Wax at 6:11 AM 4 comments
Labels: Closer to Truth
Wednesday, September 10, 2008
We're Getting "Closer to Truth"
FROM ROBERT LAWRENCE KUHN, CREATOR AND HOST OF CLOSER TO TRUTH: All my life I’ve struggled with God, lurching and lapsing from one side to another, sometimes by design, often by default. As a young man, I did a doctorate in brain research, thinking that if we could understand the brain, the most complex expression of matter in the universe (as far as we know) and the means by which we know everything, perhaps we could gain insight into meaning or purpose, if any, of everything. Though my career branched in other directions (investment banking, China, books), I never stopped thinking about science and God.
But how can I believe in God, if I do not understand what that God is really supposed to be? Nothing else engenders such commitment, disputation, zealotry. Such passion makes sense because if there is a God, nothing can be more important.
But does God make sense?
That’s the title of the first of 39 television episodes in the new season of Closer To Truth: Cosmos, Consciousness, God, launching tomorrow on the PBS HD network and many other PBS stations. This first episode, the lead off of the “God” subseries, features two Christian philosophers (Richard Swinburne and Alvin Plantinga), an atheistic philosopher (Daniel Dennett), an Islamic philosopher (Seyyed Hossein Nasr), a Hindu physicist (V.V. Raman), a religious scholar (Huston Smith), and a skeptic (Michael Shermer). The episode ends with Shermer, the skeptic, speaking of his fleeting moments of existential angst.
When I try to integrate God and science, I must think carefully. The two are so different, in ways subtle as well as obvious, and I fear that my hope may distort my reason. Exploring science and God means probing motivation and methodology. As for motivation, it’s natural to use science to reinforce prior belief. If I assume God exists, science shows the glory of God’s handiwork. If I assume that God does not exist, science shows how well the world works without God or anything like God. Apologetics is fine, either direction, if that’s what one wants to do and one does it openly with one’s biases bared, but it is unhelpful and intellectually dangerous if it occurs subconsciously. Fooling oneself is all too easy. As for methodology, the scientific method, based on experiment, discovers facts about the physical world, confirmable by all. The religious method, based on faith, may offer personal validation of nonphysical realms, but cannot provide public verification of anything nonphysical.
Is this progress? Not much.
In 2000, I launched Closer To Truth: Challenging Current Belief, a public television/PBS series that presented leading experts discussing fundamental issues in consciousness, cosmology, creativity, scientific breakthroughs, future studies, and other areas. In 2003, Closer To Truth: Science, Meaning and the Future dealt with subjects like autism, quantum computing, psychiatry, and order in the universe, and although only two shows were on science and religion, the search for meaning and purpose, or the lack thereof, was an undercurrent throughout.
I believe that the new season, Closer To Truth: Cosmos, Consciousness, God, is the most complete, compelling, and accessible series on these topics ever produced for television. The series' Web site will feature close to 1,400 videos of about 125 experts discussing nearly 235 topics and questions related to cosmos, consciousness, and God. Each video contains eight to 15 minutes of intense content and new ones will be posted regularly (it will take months to upload them all). The site will also stream the first three TV episodes, one each on the cosmos, consciousness, and God.
Here's a complete list of the questions we'll explore in the 39 shows—and that I, or another series participant, will discuss each Friday on this blog:
Does God Make Sense?
How Vast is the Cosmos?
Why is Consciousness so Mysterious?
Did Our Universe have a Beginning?
How are Brains Structured?
Arguing God's Existence?
Why a Fine-Tuned Universe?
Do Persons have Souls?
Arguing God from Design?
Could Our Universe Be a Fake?
Does ESP Reveal the Nonphysical?
Arguing God from First Cause?
Can Science Deal With God?
Is There Life After Death?
Arguing God from Morality?
How Many Universes Exist?
Can Brain Explain Mind?
What is the Mind-Body Problem?
Is Time Travel Possible?
Did God Create Time?
Does Evil Disprove God?
Why are Black Holes Astonishing?
What is Free Will?
Arguments for Atheism?
How does Beauty Color the Universe?
What's the Far Future of Intelligence in the Universe?
How Could God Know the Future?
How can Emergence Explain Reality?
Where are They, All those Aliens?
How Could God Interact with the World?
Is There A Final Theory of Everything?
What Things Really Exist?
Can Many Religions All be True?
Do Science & Religion Conflict?
Is the Universe Fine-Tuned for Life and Mind?
Is This the End Time?
Is Consciousness Fundamental?
Eternal Life is Like What?
Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?
So, after all this, what do I think? Does God make sense? To me, honestly, nothing makes sense!
God? No God? Both hit circularities, regresses, dead-ends.
Arguments? I love them all, but in the end, they all falter. Theistic arguments, atheistic arguments—none are dispositive. I’ve (half) joked that if I had to chose, I’d have to say that I find the atheistic arguments more palatable to swallow but the theistic conclusion more satisfying to digest. That doesn’t make sense, of course. And I guess that is my point. It’s not scientifically becoming to admit belief without reason. But to me, honesty trumps image.
Throughout this multiyear adventure of producing and hosting Closer To Truth, perhaps I’ve progressed. I now see a richer, more textured picture of what a Supreme Being, if such a being exists, might be like.
Many people seem certain of their beliefs. I wish I were certain. I may continue lurching and lapsing in my beliefs, but I will never cease wondering, striving, searching.
As for me, for now, passionate uncertainty is closer to truth.
Robert Lawrence Kuhn or another participant in the Closer to Truth TV series will share their views on the previous day's episode every Friday. Coming up this week: V.V. Raman on "Does God Make Sense?"
Posted by Heather Wax at 10:33 AM 4 comments
Labels: Closer to Truth
Friday, December 12, 2008
Is There Life After Death?
FROM ROBERT LAWRENCE KUHN, HOST AND CREATOR OF CLOSER TO TRUTH: When my second son was five years old, we held a garage sale. In a halting, squeaky voice, Adam begged me not to sell his beloved tricycle.
“But you’ve grown too big for it,” I said, appealing to logic.
“But I’ll grow up, get old, and die,” he responded cheerily, “and when I’m little again, I’ll have my bike.”
My worldly wisdom collapsed. How did he know about death? We hadn’t discussed death in his presence; no relative had died. Perhaps television, friends? Somehow, death had entered his world. But why was he so sure he’d be back? That was more puzzling. I could detect no antecedent. Perhaps the permanent cessation of life seemed so inconceivable, so discordant with childhood sentience, that coming back just seemed self-evident.
I’d like to live forever ... wouldn’t everyone? I really mean it. Could we survive bodily death? Could our personal awareness transcend physical decay?
It seems absurd. It seems obvious.
Whether there is, or is not, life after death is the most singularly personal question we can ask, and the only two possible answers are in radical conflict. Everything we know about third-person science argues that life after death is impossible, absurd. Should we not follow the evidence of our senses? Yet, everything we feel about first-person consciousness argues that life after death is self-evident, obvious. Should a being who perceives eternity and desires it deeply be denied it?
No mere intellectual inquiry, this. The answer affects us. All of us. Forever. (Although what we conclude, either way, has no relationship to what is real.)
I fear "no life after death," but there is one thing I fear even more: fooling myself into believing that there is life after death when there is not. I struggle to differentiate what I know from what I believe and both from what I hope. Hope can fog belief, and both can distort knowledge.
I step back. How can the question of life after death be assessed?
I start with two general ways of thinking: evidentialism and fideism, the former requiring sensory inputs or logical analysis (consistent with the scientific method), the latter relying on a belief system or (apparent) revelation.
As for the evidentiary approach to life after death, everything we know about the physical brain indicates that when it dies, the person dies. Scientifically, there is absolutely nothing in all of brain research to suggest otherwise.
However, there are two areas of inquiry that could be considered evidentiary or amenable to scientific study that some claim do provide support, if not absolute proof, of life after death: the putative communication with the dead through mediums, séances, and the like, and the ostensible visions of “near death experiences” (NDEs). Each area has given rise to vast literature, libraries actually, that I cannot here summarize. But I can offer personal opinion.
On communications with the dead, I should find it odd in the extreme if (i) human beings really do survive death, and (ii) if the deceased really can and do interact with the living, why their apparent communications should be, at best, well, so fringy. How could such a monumental part of reality—the immortal nature of human consciousness—express itself so infrequently, so inconsequentially, and through such flaky intermediaries? Why, too, after so many serious researchers have pursued survival for so long, is its legitimacy so poorly accepted? Oh, I’ve certainly heard reasons or rationalizations why this might be so, but they all strain credulity.
As for NDEs, I’ve never given the claims credence. They seem little more than stress-induced brain physiology caused by lack of oxygen—or other such chemical insults or trauma brought about as a corollary or epiphenomenon of whatever was causing the near death in the first place. I do not consider NDEs as differing in principle from “seeing stars” if hit over the head or visualizing colors when poked or pushed in the eye.
Arguments for imbuing NDEs with larger meaning call attention to the similar visions among diverse cultures (i.e., seeing lights, tunnels, meeting angelic-like beings) and the idea that through these visions people learn special things that would be difficult to explain by conventional means. As for the similar visions, well, all humans in all cultures have similar brains, and they are affected in similar ways by trauma. Furthermore, it is not clear that the cross-cultural visions are similar: Non-Christians, to my knowledge, do not readily see figures reminiscent of Jesus or Mary. As for knowledge of special things, I’ve never seen any evidence. There is another counterargument against the evidentiary claim of life after death made by those people who supposedly communicate with the dead, generally through mediums of one kind of another, and who learn information that apparently could not be known without the “dead-person transmission.” Follow this: Even if careful investigation would prove the veracity of the information and even if the information could not have been known through common or subtle sensory mechanisms—admissions I am not prepared to make—such information would still not prove survival beyond death.
Such “impossible-to-know information,” as philosopher Stephen Braude has shown, could have been apprehended through various “super-psi” mechanisms—higher-levels or complex combinations of extrasensory perception (ESP) that can masquerade as coming from dead people. In other words, paranormal knowledge gleaned through telepathy (mind-to-mind transfer), clairvoyance (perceptions beyond the ordinary senses), or precognition (knowing the future) can manifest itself as if coming from deceased beings, and it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish among the various possible originating sources. [Note: One does not have to believe in the reality of ESP to appreciate that its possibility alone presents a major stumbling block to those who seek to corroborate life after death by the special information supposedly imparted by communications from the dead.]
For Christians, the resurrection of Jesus is the most powerful proof for life after death. Many believers claim that, in addition to confirmation by faith, Jesus’ resurrection is confirmable by history, by the kinds of evidence that would pass the test of historical scholarship. Obviously, this claim is not universally acceptable nor is its historicity the unanimous declaration of Christian scholars.
As for the fideistic approach to life after death, it is certainly true that virtually all cultures and religions have a strong and enduring tradition of survival beyond death. Although such traditions, whether based on written scriptures or oral transmissions, can be dismissed as pre-scientific and superstitious, something like ancient animism, the ubiquity of such beliefs horizontally across disparate human societies and vertically through diverse human histories does call for, in my opinion, some consideration.
But congruence among religions—say, among the Abrahamic religions (i.e., Judaism, Christianity, and Islam)—offers scant support for the veracity of an afterlife. The reason is that doctrinal beliefs are often derived from similar scriptures and interconnected philosophers.
So how to discern and dissect out what, if anything, is real? How to categorize the fideism approach? I suggest two broad categories: the existence of a traditional-like God and the primacy of consciousness.
The first category posits a Creator God and probably requires such a God to be personal, which is to say one who can and does take interest in individual human beings. The monotheistic God of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam is the prime example. If one believes in this kind of Personal Creator God, it seems a small step for such a God, assuming such a God created the entire universe and all that is, to assure life after death for any or all of the beings that God created. The mechanism that God might use to bring about life after death can vary: Creating an immortal soul is one way; resurrecting the dead is another. (Note that a God-induced resurrection works even with a purely physicalist understanding of personhood, without any immortal soul). If I believed that a Personal God created the universe, I’d find little problem in accepting that such a God could assure continuance of conscious life after bodily death.
The second approach to life after death is founded on the primacy of consciousness. This can be expressed in multiple formats and styles: the mainstreams of Eastern religions (e.g., Hinduism, Buddhism, Daoism, etc.); philosophical belief in the immortality of the soul (e.g., Plato and others); or a conviction that consciousness is fundamental in the structure of reality (e.g., panpsychism) and perhaps is more fundamental than even the physical world (e.g., idealism). Each of these belief systems can exist independent of the kind of Creator God as is commonly assumed in the Abrahamic religions.
Specific descriptions of the alleged afterlife, as one might expect, reflect individual cultures. But life after death, even if real, cannot be settled by culture. Because, as philosopher Daniel Dennett’s work shows, even in the absence of God, there would still be very good reasons why humans believe in god.
So here’s the question: Given the complete and utter absence of credible evidence for life after death, why would I give any credence at all to the claims of religion or consciousness? It cannot be based on science because, ipso facto, science shows the opposite, that there is no possibility of life after death. So such a belief would have to be, yes, in spite of science.
This possibility I do not exclude because, by definition, the essence or nature of religion and consciousness is nonphysical; therefore, by definition, religion and consciousness are not in thrall to the evidentiary imperative, the scientific standard of truth. If this sounds like rationalization, it is because it is rationalization. The question is whether it may also be something more.
How do I conclude? As a scientist, any afterlife seems impossible, ludicrous. As a person, no afterlife seems inconceivable, absurd. I summarize four options.
First, I will have no life after death. I have no soul. When I become dead, I stay dead.
Second, I have a soul, and my soul is immortal. My post-death journey features heaven or hell or some state in between.
Third, I have no soul. When I die, I’m dead, out of existence. But God, at some future moment, “in the twinkling of an eye” (as the New Testament’s 1 Corinthians states), will resurrect my body and bring back my person.
Fourth, my soul, not God, is preeminent. My soul is nonphysical and immortal and perhaps journeys through cycles of reincarnation.
Four options. Only one can be true.
As for so-called evidence of an afterlife, I cannot imagine why, if we do survive death, the evidence is so weak.
As I see it, for any hope of an afterlife, the only argument that can work, if any can work at all, is that God exists and God is personal. So only if I would believe that there really is a God, a God who has concern for me (and everyone), would I hold out hope for an afterlife.
Even then, in my opinion, not an afterlife by means of an immortal soul. And not right after death. But only by some kind of, well, reconstitution of mind and body. At some unknown time. In some mysterious way. And for a purpose beyond anything we can ever know.
I think that’s correct, and closer to truth.
Robert Lawrence Kuhn speaks with Stephen Braude, Michael Tooley, J.P. Moreland, Nancey Murphy, Mahmoud Ayoub, David Shatz, and Master Hsing Yun in "Is There Life After Death?" the 14th episode in the Closer to Truth: Cosmos, Consciousness, God TV series, which airs Thursdays on the PBS HD network and many other PBS stations. Every Friday, participants in the series will share their views on the previous day's episode.
Posted by Heather Wax at 10:14 AM 2 comments
Labels: Closer to Truth
Friday, February 13, 2009
What Is Free Will?
FROM ROBERT LAWRENCE KUHN, HOST AND CREATOR OF CLOSER TO TRUTH: If it seems perfectly obvious that your will is free, that “you” are able to decide and choose as “you” quite please, then it seems perfectly clear that you don’t get it. Free will is a huge problem.
I’d never thought “free will” to be a problem. If I want to walk, I walk; sit, I sit.
Here’s the problem. Since every physical event has a prior and sufficient cause, then every current movement of atoms is caused by some prior movement of atoms, including all those atoms that compose all those neurons in my brain that “decide and choose” to walk or sit.
What’s the alternative? That physical events can happen without prior and sufficient cause? That seems immediately wrong because it would limit regularities in the world, make laws capricious, obviate science.
Where then free will? Can nonphysical spirits or souls be saviors? That’s what most theists assume. But spirits and souls have their own problems: How on earth does a nonphysical substance interact with a closed physical world?
What then free will? The question is more fundamental than I’d ever imagined.
To Peter van Inwagen, a philosopher at the University of Notre Dame, free will can be characterized by an appeal to the simple word “able.” If one is able to do this and able to do that, and assuming it is not possible to do both this and that jointly, then one has free will. He defines “determinism” as the thesis that the past up to a given moment determines the one unique way that the world is going to go on after that moment. If one takes together all the laws of nature or physics, such as the conservation of energy, gravitational laws, electromagnetic laws, and the like—the real, deep, underlying, most fundamental laws—the metaphysical thesis of determinism, given those laws, allows only one possible future that is consistent with the way things are at present. One is not able to do this or that. So it seems that free will isn’t compatible with determinism.
If determinism isn’t compatible with free will, van Inwagen continues, the implication is that we’re able to do only exactly those things we do. Of course, we have the strong conviction that we could have done other things, that we were able to do things other than those that we did, but, if determinism isn’t compatible with free will, that conviction must be misleading, and free will must be an illusion.
Van Inwagen frames the free will problem provocatively: Free will is either incompatible with determinism or it’s compatible with determinism—and you can prove both propositions wrong! Now, suppose that free will is both incompatible with determinism and incompatible with indeterminism. Since determinism and indeterminism are the only two possibilities, free will is now incompatible with every possibility, so it’s impossible. But, van Inwagen concludes, “it would be a greater mystery if there were no free will.”
Since determinism is the case in which every event is caused completely by a previous event, is determinism compatible or incompatible with free will? This is the critical question.
My first feeling was: No, determinism cannot be compatible with free will.
But then what?
No determinism? What then the physical world?
No free will? What then our intuition?
Free will seems simple, but the more one thinks about it, the more complex it becomes.
John Searle, a leading philosopher of mind at the University of California, Berkeley, calls the problem of free will “something of a scandal in philosophy.” As Searle puts it, “The reason that we have a special problem about free will is that we have inconsistent views, each of which is supported by what are apparently overwhelming reasons. The reason for believing that we have free will is we experience it every day. We have the experience of conscious, rational decision-making, and we have the experience that the decisions were not themselves forced by antecedently sufficiently causal conditions. We can’t shake off the conviction of free will.”
But on the other side, Searle continues, “we’ve got an overwhelming amount of evidence that everything that happens has an explanation in terms of causally sufficient conditions.” In the natural world, in principle, we can always tell a story or explain a mechanism for why things happen the way they do, and since “human behavior is part of the natural world, it looks like it ought to be explained in terms of causally sufficient conditions.”
Searle states that not only are the two assertions, free will and determinism, incompatible, but “it’s hard to see how we could give up on either of them.” We can’t kill off either one. We’re stuck with both. And they’re not compatible. That’s the mystery.
Free will is no mystery to Daniel Dennett, the distinguished philosopher at Tufts University. Nor is he disturbed by arguments that free will and determinism are not compatible.
First of all, Dennett asserts that “for 2,000 years or more, people have been looking in the wrong place. They’ve been looking at physics, determinism and indeterminism in physics. They should have been looking at biology because the key to free will is recognizing that free will is a biological-level phenomenon. It’s not a physics-level phenomenon. We are freer than our parts. Our parts don’t have free will. But we do.”
But how could that possibly be, without adding something novel, something mysterious? How can free will be made compatible with determinism?
Dennett’s move is not to show that our actions aren’t determined, but rather to show that our actions are not inevitable.
Say what? It would seem that if the future is determined it is inevitable. So what does Dennett claim the word “inevitable” adds?
Dennett says “inevitable means unavoidable.” So then we have to understand what “avoiding” is, he says, which brings in the biological dimension. “Because what’s happened on this planet over the last 4 billion years has been an explosion of avoiding: avoiding dissolution, avoiding being eaten, avoiding starving to death. What evolution has done is designed organisms that do avoiding. How do you avoid something? By anticipating it and then taking corrective measures. Simplest case: incoming brick. You see it, you duck: You avoid it. But suppose you were determined to duck. Well then the brick was never going to hit you. It just seemed as if it was going to hit you. What we have to understand is that free will is our capacity to see probable futures, futures that seem like they’re going to happen, and see them in time to take steps so that something else happens instead.”
Dennett adds that while “you can’t change the past, you can’t change the future either. But what you can do is change what you thought the future was going to be into something else, even though it’s all determined. Biological creatures are determined by the evolutionary process to become better and better avoiders.”
In trying to understand Dennett’s argument, I suggested that his definition of free will seemed impoverished, at least compared with conventional descriptions. He agreed: “I think we have to recognize that there are varieties of free will.” As for “the traditional varieties,” Dennett says, “who cares whether we’ve got them?” The varieties of free will “worth wanting,” he states, are “perfectly compatible with determinism.”
So Dennett’s determinism erodes some of the comfortable notions of “free will” because everything we do is “determined” by the underlying physics of our brains and its environment. Even so, Dennett says, because biological creatures have learned how to avoid bad things, nothing is “inevitable.”
All is determined? But not inevitable? I’ll have to ponder that.
Maybe we’ve pushed philosophy as far as it can go? I check with some other friends.
Psychologist Susan Blackmore, a former parapsychologist turned active skeptic, argues that “there can’t be free will in the traditional sense. When you see how the brain works, how information flows through the brain, there’s no place for free will. So let’s give up on it!”
California Institute of Technology brain scientist Christof Koch, a pioneer in discovering the neural correlates of behavior, says, “I’m ambivalent about free will. Right now, I don’t see how in a physicalist [purely material] universe, free will can survive. On the other hand, I have this profound feeling of free will.” According to Koch, “Almost by definition, if you’re not a dualist, physicalism is all there is: All that exists are space and time, energy and mass and fields of force, which means, of course, there’s no free will. If you’re not a dualist, I do not see where free will could come from because there’s nothing else except blind chance and necessity.”
What do I think? 1) My will is fully free. 2) Free will is not an illusion. 3) Free will is not compatible with determinism. If I cannot do otherwise, no matter the philosophical maneuverings, I’m sorry, my will is not fully free.
What would it take for my will to be fully free? Nothing less than a causal “gap” across which prior physical forces could not leap, at least not with absolute certainty. Somewhere the chain of deterministic events must be broken. It only takes one place.
But that, too, seems impossible because the entire universe is a closed physical system. What about the appeal to the random uncertainty of quantum mechanics, a popular if superficial free-will escape clause. That doesn’t seem to help—even if meaningful quantum computations could occur macroscopically in the hot, wet brain. After all, how could random uncertainty generate free will?
Is there no solution? After analyzing the arguments, van Inwagen, a savvy and sophisticated and not shy philosopher, concludes, “I regard free will as a complete mystery.”
For just this reason, the problem of free will takes us closer to truth.
Robert Lawrence Kuhn speaks with Peter van Inwagen, John Searle, Daniel Dennett, Susan Blackmore, Christof Koch, and Alan Leshner in “What Is Free Will?” the 23rd episode in the Closer to Truth: Cosmos, Consciousness, God TV series, which airs Thursdays on the PBS HD network and many other PBS stations. Every Friday, participants in the series will share their views on the previous day's episode.
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Labels: Closer to Truth